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83 Cal.Rptr. 411
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
Thomas MORAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 13525.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.

4. Criminal Law *"569

Accused's burden to prove entrapment
is not subject to statute requiring prosecution to establish accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, for defense of entrapment is not based on accused's innocence.
West's Ann.Evid.Code, § 501; West's
Ann.Pen.Code,§ 1096.

Jan. 27, 1970.

5. Criminal Law *"37

Defendant was convicted in the Supe. rior Court, Orange County, William C.
Speirs, J., for sale and possession of LSD,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court held
that from evidence that accused sold 20
tablets containing LSD to bureau of narcotic enforcement agent and that accused
had tablets in his possession for two
months, the jury could infer that intention
to sell the tablet's originated in accused's
mind and hence entrapment as a matter of
law was not established.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

Traynor, C.
briner,

JJ.,

J.,

and Peters and To-

dissented.

Opinion, 76 Cal.Rptr. 879, vacated.
I. Criminal Law *,,37

Entrapment as matter of law is not established where there is any substantial evidence in record from which it may be inferred that the criminal intent to commit
the particular offense originated in mind
of accused.
2. Criminal Law e=>739(1)

If crime was suggested by another
person, whether or not a law enforcement
officer, for purpose of entrapment, the defendant is not criminally liable.
6. Criminal Law e=>661

The People are not required to call
any particular witness so long as the material evidence relating to the charge against
accused is produced in a manner according
him a fair trial.
7. Criminal Law *"700

In view of fact that accused knew informer who was a participant in sale of
LSD, and in view of fact that accused was
present throughout series of events involving informer, knew what evidence would
be available through informer's testimony,
and could have called him as a witness, the
People's failure to call informer could not
be characterized as a suppression of evidence.
8. CrIminal Law *,,1171(1)

Prosecutor's reference to marijuana
during cross-examination of defendant accused of selling LSD did not amount to
prejudicial rnisconduct~ where these references are merely slips of tongue and prosecutor meant to ask about LSD.

From evidence that accused sold 20
tablets containing LSD to bureau' of narcotic enforcement agent and that -, ac«:used
had tablets in his possession for two
months, the jury could infer that intention
to sell the tablets originated in accused's
mind and hence entrapment as a matter of
law was not established.

Accused could not, complain on appeal
of admission of testimony given by a defense witness on direct examination, since
accused was responsible for introduction of
the evidence.

3. Criminal Law e=>317

10. Infants e=>69

Accused's failure to call informer, who
was a participant in sale of LSD, as a witness supported inference that his testimony
would not be favorable to accused. West's
Ann.Evid.Code, § 412.

Even if accused waives application for
probation and does not request referral to
youth authority, trial court must on its
own motion consider whether accused
should be referred to the authority.

9. Criminal Law *"1137(5)
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II. Criminal Law <$=01144(9)

Absent showing that trial conrt failed
to exercise its discretion to consider
whether defendant should be referred to
youth authority, it must be presumed that
it did so.
12. Criminal Law oS;>I93V2

Conviction of a lesser included offense
is an implied acquittal of the offense
charged when the jury returns a verdict of
guilty of only the lesser included offense.
13. Criminal Law oS;>193'h

'When jury expressly finds accused
guihy of both greater and lesser offense,
there is no implied acquittal of greater offense.
14. Criminal Law

~1209

If evidence supports verdict as to
greater offense, the conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of
the lesser offense must be reversed.

James W. Read, Jr., Costa Mesa, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appel\ant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William
E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert T.
Jacobs, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff
and respondent.
PER CURIAM.
An information charged defendant with
selling lysergic acid diethylamine (hereinafter LSD) in violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11912. At the trial
the court instructed the jury on the lesser
included offense of possession of LSD
(Health & Saf.Code, § 11910.) The jury
found defendant guilty of sale and possession of LSD. Defendant waived application for probation, and the court sentenced
him to the state prison for the term pre·
scribed by law for the sale and to one year
in the county jail for possession. It sus·
pended execution of sentence on the pos·
session conviction pending completion of
service of sentence on the sale conviction,
after which the suspension would become
permanent. Defendant appeals.

During June 1967, Agents David Fuentes
and Robert L. Mooney of the Bureau of
Narcotic Enforcement were working in the
Orange County area with Robert J. McNerney, a police informant At 4 :35 p.m.
on June 13, 1967, the agents received a
phone call from McNerney concerning a
sale of drugs. The agents went to a shopping center in Capistrano Beach. Shortly
after they arrived, McNerney drove up and
parked beside Agent Fuentes. Defendant
was a passenger in McNerney's car.
Agent Mooney was nearby. Agent
Fuentes left his car and went over to
McNerney. He talked briefly with McNerney and then walked to defendant's
side of the car. After a brief conversation, defendant handed 20 tablets to Agent
Fuentes, who dropped $80 in defendant's
lap. The tablets contained usable amounts
of LSD.
Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He did not deny the sale but relied
on the defense of entrapment. He testified that at the time of the sale he was 18
years old. He lived with his grandmother
in Fontana, where he worked for the telephone company. He had stopped at a cafe
in San Clemente while on his way to visit
his mother in Carlsbad. Defendant had
previously lived in San Clemente where he
had gone to high school. McNerney was a
friend and classmate who had lived near
him in San Clemente. Leaving the cafe,
defendant walked over to the pier where
he met McNerney about 3 p.m. McNerney
asked if defendant knew where he could
buy LSD for a friend. McNerney explained that his friend asked him to obtain
LSD and that he had been unable to do so.
Defendant replied that he had none and
did not know where to get any. McNerney said he was upset by not being able
to buy any for his friend, who needed the
drug badly.
A short time later McNerney returned
and asked if defendant was certain he
knew of no source of LSD. Defendant
admitted having some tablets but said they
were not for sale. McN eroey then sug-
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gested that defendant sell him a few so
that his friend would let him alone. MeNerney appealed to their friendship, statiog that if the roles were reversed he
would help defendant. Defendant again
refused, saying the tablets were for his
own use, and the two parted.
As defendant was walking up the pier,
MeN erney approached him a third time.
McNerney asked how many tablets defendant had, and defendant said ZO. McNerney
stated that his friend needed only a few
and would pay well. When McNerney
. again appealed to their past friendship and
said that he would sell defendant the tablets if their positions were reversed, de·
fendant agreed to sell all 20. McNerney
said the friend would pay $80.
The two then drove a short distance in
McNerney's car to the location where defendant had hidden the tablets. They
picked up the LSD and then drove to the
shopping center where they met Agent Fuentes. After a short conversation with
McNerney, Fuentes asked defendant if he
had the tablets. Defendant said "Yes,"
and Fuentes said, "Give them to me." Defendant handed the tablets to Fuentes, who
dropped the $80 in his lap.
Fuentes testified' that defendant said he
had 20' tablets' and wanted $80 for them
and that defendant was not hesitant in
making the sale. Defendant testified that
he knew it was a crime to possess LSD
and that he had the tablets for two months
before the sale.

[1-3] Defendant contends that the evidence establishes entrapment as a matter
of law. The jury, however, was not required to believe his testimony that he was
entrapped (People v. Benford (1959) 53
Cal.2d I, 5, 345 P.2d 928), and the prosecution evidence does not establish entrapment
J. "InSofar as any statute, except Section

522, assigns the burden of proof in a
criminal action, such statute is subject to
Penal Code Section 1096."
2. "A defendant in a criminal a~ion is presumed to be innocent until the contrary
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as a matter of law. "En~apment as a
matter of law is not established where
there is any substantial evidence in the
record from which it may be inferred that
the criminal intent
commit the particular
offense originated in the mind of the accused." (People v. Terry (1955) 44 Cal.2d
371, 372-373, 282 P.2d 19, 20.) From the
evidence that defendant sold 20 tablets
containing LSD to Fuentes and that defendant had the tablets in his possession
for two months the jury could infer that
the intention to sell the tablets originated
in defendant's mind (see People v" Diaz
(l962) 206 Cal.App.2d 651, 671, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 367; disapproved on other grounds
in People v. Perez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769,
776, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934, fn. 2;
19 Hastings L.J. 825, 844). Moreover, defendant's failure to call MeN emey as a
witness supports an inference that his testimony would not be favorable to defendant. (Evid.Code, § 412.)

to

[4] Defendant also contends that the
recent enactment of the Evidence Code
overturns the holding in People v. Valverde (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 318, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 528, that the defendant has the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. Evidence Code section SOP subjects statutory burdens of
proof in criminal cases to Penal Code section 1096," which requires the prosecution
to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The defendant's' burden
to prove entrapment, however, 'is not subj ect to Penal Code section 1096, for the defense of entrapment in California is not
based on the defendant's innocence. The
courts have created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct "out of regard for [the court's] own diguity, and in
the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply

is proved, and- in case of a reasonable
doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but
the effect of this presumption is only to
place upon the state the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."
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proper standards for judicial enforcement
of the criminal law." (People v. Benford,
supra, 53 Cal.2d I, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933.)
Moreover, this court acknowledged the
continuing validity of the rule of the Valverde case in In re M. (1969) 70 A.c. 460,
473, 75 Cal.Rptr. I, 450 P.2d 296, fn. 10.'
[5] Defendant's contention that the
trial court did not instruct the jury that a
third party informer is to be treated as an
agent of law enforcement officers for purposes of entrapment is likewise without
merit. The trial court properly instructed
the jury that if the crime was suggested by
another person, whether or not a law enforcement officer, for the purpose of entrapment, the defendant is not criminally
liable. 4
[6, 7] Defendant contends that the
prosecution's failure to call McNerney as a
witness denied him his right to confront
his accusers. The People are not required
to call any particular witness so long as
the material evidence relating to the
charge against defendant is produced in a
manner according him a fair trial. (People v. Kiihoa (1%0) 53 CaJ.2d 748, 752, 3
CaJ.Rptr. I, 349 P.2d 673.) The failure of
the People to call an informer may manifest an intention to suppress material evidence going to defendant's guilt or innocence. To prevent such an abuse the People, when asked on cross-examination, must
3. The Model Penal Code, section 2.13(2)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) also plnces
the burden on defendant to prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. CALJIC No. 851 (Revised). "The law
does not tolerate one per8on, particularly
a law enforcement officer, generating in
the mind of another person who is innocent of any criminal purpose, the original
intent to commit a crime thus inducing
such person to commit a crime which he
would not have committed or even contemplated but for such induC€ment.
"If the intent to commit the crime did
not originate with the defendant and he
was not carrying ont his own criminal
purpose, but the crime was suggested by
another person for the purpose of entrapping and causing the arrest of the defendant, then the defendant is not criminally

disclose the identity of the in former or incur a dismissal. (People v. Perez (1965)
62 CaJ.2d 769, 773, 44 CaJ.Rptr. 326, 401
P2d 934.) In the present case, however,
defendant knew the informer, who was a
participant in the sale. Defendant was
present throughout the series of events involving the informer, knew what evidence
would be available through the infonner's
testimony, and could have <:alled him as a
witness. It is manifest that the People's
failure to call McNerney cannot be characterized as a suppression of evidence.
[8] Defendant contends that the prosecuting attorney committed prejudicial misconduct by referring to marijuana during
the cross-examination of defendant. From
the context of the questions, however, it is
apparent that these references were merely
slips of the tongue and that the prosecuting attorney meant to ask about LSD. A
prompt objection would have dispelled any
possible confusion. No miscarriage of justice appears.
(See People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835, 299 P.2d 243.)
[9] Defendant also contends that the
trial court erred in admitting testimony
that McNerney was perhaps a perjurer.
Defendant does not explain how this testimony could have prejudiced him. Further~
more, the testimony was given by a defense witness on direct examination.
Since defendant is responsible for the inliable for the acts so committed." (Italics
added.)
CALJIe No. 852 (Revised). "When
law-enforcement officers are informed that
a person intends to commit a crime, the
law permits the officers to afford opportunity for the commission of the offense,
and to lend the apparent cooperation of
themselves or of a third per80n for the
purpose of detecting the offender. When
officers do this, if the suspect himself.
originally and independently of the officers, intends to commit the acts constituting a crime, and if he does acts necessary
to constitute the crime, he is guilty of
the crime committed. He has no defense in the fact that an officer or other
person engaged in detecting crime was
present and provided the opportunity, or
aided or encouraged the commisson of
the offense." (Italics added.)

PEOPLE ... MORAN
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troduction of the evidence, he cannot complain on appeal that its admission was eTrOT. (See Witkin, Cal.. Evidence (2d ed.
1966) § 1286, p. 1189.)

[10] Defendant contends that the trial
court erred in failing to exercise its discretion to consider whether defendant should
be referred to the California Youth Authority. Defendant waived application for
probation and did not request referral to
the Youth Authority. IIi such cases, however, a trial court must on its own motion
consider the referral of eligible defendants.
(People v. Sparks (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d
597, 600, 68 Cal.Rptr. 909.) On this matter
the record is silent.
[11] It is presumed that official duty
has been regularly performed.
(Evid.
Code, § 664.) The record shows that defendant was 18 years old and shortly before trial had pleaded guilty to possession
of marijuana. (Health & Saf.Code, §
11530.) Although no probation report was
prepared, the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion. In the absence of any showing to
the contrary, we must presume that it did
so. (People v. Sparks, supra, 262 Cal.
App.2d 597, 600-601, 68 Ca1.Rptr. 909.)
The trial court instructed the jury on the
lesser included offense of possession of
LSD. The last paragraph of its instruction read: "If the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included offense, but you entertain a reasonable doubt
as to which offense the defendant is guilty,
it is your duty to find -him guilty only of
the lesser offense." (CALJIC No. 115
(Revised).) The jury was not instructed
that it should return only one verdict, and
it found defendant guilty of both sale and
possession of LSD.

[12--14] Conviction of a lesser included
offense is an implied acquittal of the offense charged when the jury returns a verdict of guilty of only the lesser included
offense. (Gomez v. Superior Court (1958)
50 Cal.2d 640, 645, 328 P.2d 976.) When
the· jury expressly finds defendant guilty

CaL
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of both the greater and lesser offense,
however, there is no implied acquittal of
the greater offense. If the evidence Supports the verdict as to a greater offense,
the conviction of that offense is controlling, and the convictio':1 of the lesser offense must be reversed. (People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007; People v. Greer
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 599, 184 P.2d 512.)
The judgment of conviction of violation
of Health and Safety Code section 11910 is
reversed. The judgment of conviction of
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11912 is affirmed.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The trial court instructed the jury that
"[i]f the intent to commit the crime did
not originate with the defendant and he
was not carrying out his own criminal purpose, but the crime was suggested by another person for the purpose of entrapping
and causing the arrest of the defendant,
then the defendant is not criminally liable
for the acts so committed." (CALJIC No.
851 (Revised).) The jury rejected the defense and found defendant guilty.
It is my opinion that the cases on which
this instruction was based should be overruled (see notes 1 and 2, infra) and that
the issue of entrapment should be determined by the trial court.
The theory of the defense of entrapment
as it bears on the elements of the defense
and the issue whether it presents a question for the court or jury sharply divided
the United States Supreme Court on the
two occasions it confronted these problems.
The court held that entrapment goes to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. According to its test, if the intent to commit the
offense originated in the accused's mind,
entrapment cannot be established; if the
intent originated in the mind of a law enforcement officer the defense is established. The issue is for the jury to decide.
(Sherman v. United States (1958) 356 U.S.
369, 78 S.C!. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848; Sorrells
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v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 435, 53
S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413.) A minority of
the Justices would permit the defense, not
because the accused is innocent, but to protect the purity of government processes
and to deter impermissible police conduct.
In their view these policies, basic to the
administration of justice, are for the court,
not the jury, to enforce. (Sherman v.
United States, supra, 356 U.S. 369, 378, 78
S.Ct. 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Sorrells v. United States, supra, 287 U.S.
435, 453, 53 S.Ct 210 (Roberts, J., concurring).)
In 1959 this Court adopted the government policy and police conduct theory of
the defense. "[O]ut of regard for its own
dignity, and in the exercise of its power

and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law, the

court refuses to enable officers of the law
to consummate illegal or unjust schemes
designed to foster rather than prevent and
detect crime." (People v. Benford (1959)
53 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933.) The
I. People v. Francis (1969) 71 A.C. 69,

81, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591;
People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27,
49. 9 Cul.Rptr. 793. 357 P.2d 1049; People v. Tambini (1969) 275 A.C.A. 863,
870, 80 Cal.Rptr. 179; People v. Chatfield (1969) 272 A.C.A. 161, 168, 77
Cal.Rptr. 118; People v. Dickerson
(1969) 270 A.C.A. 382, 394. 75 Cal.
Rptr. 828; People v. Glaser (1968) 265
Cal.App.2d 849, 852, 71 Cal.Rptr. 706;
People v. Sweet (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d
167, 170, 65 Cal.Rptr. 31; People v.
Barone (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 776, 781,
58 Cal.Rptr. 783; Los Robles Motor
Lodge, Inc. v. Departmen t of Alcoholic
Beverage Control (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d
198, 206. 54 Cal.Rptr. 547; People v.
Goree (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 304, 311,
49 CaLRptr. 392; People v. Hicks (1963)
222 Cal.App.2d 265, 270, 35 Cal.Rptr.
149; People v. Tostado (1963) 217 Cal.
App.2d 713, 719, 32 Cal.Rptr. 178; People v. Hawkins (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d
669, 672, 27 Cal.Rptr. 144; People v.
Harris (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 613, 616,
26 Cal.Rptr. 850; People v. Head (1962)
208 Cal.App.2d 360, 366, 25 Cal.Rptr.
124; People v. Cline (1962) 205 Cal
App.2d 309, 311, 22 C.l.Rptr. 916; Peo-

court acknowledged that in the past California courts placed at least as much emphasis on the susceptibility of the defendant as on the propriety of the police methods (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 1,
9-10, 354 P.2d 928), but stated that now
the court was primarily concerned with police conduct. (People v. Benford, supra,
53 Ca1.2d 1, 13, 354 P.2d 928, fn. 5.) Nevertheless, decisions since Benford repeatedly have used the origin of intent test for
entrapment 1 and have committed the issue
to the jury.! In so doing they have departed from the rationale of the Benford
case and seriously undermined the deterrent effect of the entrapment defense on
impermissible police conduct
Because the purpose of the defense is to
control impermissible police conduct, "it is
wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to
commit the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the
criminal conduct was the product of 'the
creative activity' of law-enforcement officials." (Sherman v. United States, supra,
356 U.S. 369, 382, 78 Cal.Rptr. 819, 825
pie v. Burnett (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d
453, 456, 22 CaLRptr. 320; People v.
Ortiz (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 250, 258,
19 Ca1.Rptr. 211; People v. D'Agostino
(1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 447, 463, 11 Cal
Rptr. 847; People v. Valdez (1961) 188
Cal.App.2d 750, 759, 10 Cal.Rptr. 664;
People v. Rivers (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d
189, 192, 10 Cal.Rptr. 309; People v.
Buckman (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 51,
8 Cal.Rptr. 765; People v. Haggard
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 38, 44, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 898; People v. Serrano (1960) 180
Cal.App.2d 243, 248, 4 C.I.Rptr. 470;
see CALJIC No. 851 (Revised).
2. People v. Mason (1969) 276 A.C.A. 473,
475, 81 Cal.Rptr. 195; People v. Walters
(1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 834. 845, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 766; People v. Carter (1967) 251
Cal.App.2d 400, 404, 59 Cal.Rptr. 394;
People v. Hicks (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d
265, 270, 35 Cal.Rptr. 149; People v.
Hawkins (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 669,
672, 27 CaLRptr. 144; People v. Head
(1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 360, 365, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 124; People v. Austin (1961) 198
Cal.App.2d 186, 189, 17 Cal.Rptr. 782;
People v. D'Agostino (1961) 190 Cal.
App.2d 447, 462, 11 Cal.Rptr. 847.
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(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rotenberg,
The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement (1963) 49 Va.L.Rev. 871, 892893.) Instead, the court must concern itself with the activity it would seek to control. It must not lose sight of that purpose
by focusing on the character and conduct
of the accused. (See Remarks of Professor Paulsen, ALI Proceedings 1959, p.
228.)
Not all police conduct can be condemned,
however, merely because it might tempt a
person into crime. Criminal activity such
as prostitution and traffic in narcotics normally does not bring complaints from its
willing "victims." To enforce laws against
such activities, an officer often must become a seemingly willing participant in
crime. (See Tiffany et al., Detection of
Crime (1967) p. 209.) In so doing, however, he may not engage in methods that
might induce persons to commit offense
who would not otherwise do so, thereby
manufacturing rather than preventing
crime.

The line must be drawn between methods likely to persuade those otherwise unwilling to commit an offense from methods
likely to persuade only those who are ready
to do so. If the purpose of the defense of
entrapment is to be achieved, the test must
be objective and focus only on the methods
used. In the case of traffic in narcotics,
law-abiding citizens would not ordinarily
be seduced into becoming involved in such
traffic by an officer's offer to purchase
them. Such an offer, howeve.r, is quite
likely to lead to a sale when made to one
prepared to sell. Accordingly, such an offer without more would not constitute entrapment. If in addition, however, the officer· adopts methods of persuasion and inducement that create a substantial risk that
a person other than one ready to commit
the crime solicited will commit the crime,
the defense of entrapment is established.
(See Model Pen. Code, § 2.13(1) (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).)

The post-Benford cases following the
rule that the defense of entrapment should
463 P.2d-49

be determined by the jury have not discussed the significance of that case to that
rule, and neither the pre-Benford (see, e.
g., People v. Gutierrez (1954) 128 Cal.
App.2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65) nor postBenford cases have given any explanation
for the rule.
Under the rationale of the Benford case,
submission of the issue to the jury cannot
be justified on the ground that it goes to
the defendant's guilt or innocence. The
crucial issue is whether the court or the
jury can best achieve the purpose of the
defense: the deterrence of impermissible
police conduct. A jury verdict of guilty or
not guilty tells the police nothing about the
jury's evaluation of the police conduct. A
verdict of guilty may mean that the jury
did not believe the defendant's testimony
that would have established entrapment. It
may also mean that the jury did not believe that the conduct created a substantial
risk of inducing one not ready to commit
the offense into doing so. Since the defendant may assert entrapment and also
deny that he committed the crime (People
v. Perez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 775-776, 44
CaI.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934), a "not guilty"
verdict may also shed no light on the
jury's assessment of police conduct. Moreover, even when the verdict settles the issue of entrapment in the particular case, it
"cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for the future. Only the
court, through the gradual evolution of explicit standards in accumulated precedents,
can do this with the degree of certainty
that wise administration of criminal justice
demands." (Sherman v. United States, supra, 356 U.S. 369, 385, 78 S.Ct. 819, 827.
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord,
Model Pen.Code § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).) In other areas involving police conduct, we have recognized the
paramount importance of committing the
assessment of such conduct to the court.
Thus, the trial court, subject to appropriate
appellate review, determines the admissibility of confessions and other evidence
claimed to have been illegally obtained.
(People v. Gorg (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 776,
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780-781, 291 P.2d 469; Pen. Code, § 1538.5(c); Evid.Code, § 405; see Witkin, Cal.
Evid. (2d 1966) § 492, pp. 462-463.) It
should also determine the issue of entrapment.
PETERS and TOBRINER,

JJ.,

concur.

o j ~m"':::'":::":::''''''''"=''
T

cise the particular skill and diligence expected of it.
3. Insurance 02;>83(1)

If an insurance agent negligently induces an insurer to assume coverage on
which it suffers a loss the agent is liable,
but liability is not incurred by a mere error
of judgment in the exercise of discretion
unless the error is based on want of care or
diligence.
4. Insurance <8=>83(1)

83 Cal.Rptr. 418
UNITED STATES LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

v.
HAIDINGER-HAYES, INC. and V. M.

Hardinger, Defendants and
Appellanis.
L. A. 29620.

Supreme Court ot California,
In Bank.
Jan. 20, 1970.

In action by insurer against its general
agent and its president, findings as to custom of brokers in the community in evaluating "loss ratio" in determination of an
appropriate premium rate were relevant to
issue of degree of care and skill required
of the agent.
5. Insurance

~83(1)

Evidence sustained finding that insurer's general agent was negligent in recommending issuance of policy on terms and at
rate which were used.
6. Corporations

~306

Action by insurer against corporate
general agent and its president to recover
damages on ground that defendants recommended a poor insurance risk. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Walter H.
Odemar, J" rendered judgment against defendants, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, McComb, J'J held, inter alia,
that evidence did not support finding that
president was personally liable to insurer
by reason of negligent performance of his
corporate duties.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Opinion, 71 Cal.Rptr. 721, vacated.

Directors and officers of a corporation
are not personally liable on contract signed
by them for and on behalf of the corporation unless they purport to bind themselves
individually.

I. Negligence 02;>1

8. ,Corporations

Actionable negligence involves a legal
duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate
or legal cause of the resulting injury.

Directors or officers of corporation
are not responsible to third persons for
negligence amounting to merely nonfeasance, to a breach of duty owing to the
corporation alone; the act must also constitute a breach of the duty owed to the
third person.

2. Principal and Agent <8=>61(1)

A professional agent is required to
have the particular knowledge and to exer-

7. Corporations

~306

Directors or officers of a corporation
do not incur personal liability for torts of
the corporation merely by reason of their
official position unless they participate in
the wrong or authorize or direct that they
be done, but they may be liable, under
rules of tort and agency, for tortious acts
committed on behalf of the corporation.
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